Login | August 29, 2025
Court rules offender ineligible for judicial release
DAN TREVAS
Supreme Court
Public Information Office
Published: August 29, 2025
An Ohio appeals court wrongly granted judicial release to an offender serving a 15–50 year “indefinite” prison sentence for crimes committed in 1995, the Supreme Court of Ohio ruled recently.
In a 6-1 decision, the Supreme Court ruled Daniel Staffrey is ineligible for judicial release. A Mahoning County trial court granted his release in 2023 after Staffrey served more than half his sentence, and the Seventh District Court of Appeals affirmed the decision.
The Mahoning County Prosecutor’s Office objected to freeing Staffrey and argued the sentence imposed on him in 1996, pertaining to crimes committed in 1995, does not make him an “eligible offender” that can seek judicial release.
Writing for the Court majority, Justice Daniel R. Hawkins explained the Seventh District erred by concluding the General Assembly expanded the definition of “eligible offender” in 2011 to include inmates serving indefinite sentences like Staffrey. The Seventh District failed to consider the full definition of “eligible offender” in the relevant statute, which excludes the sentence Staffrey received, he wrote. The Court remanded the case to the trial court, directing it to deny Staffrey’s request for release.
Chief Justice Sharon L. Kennedy and Justices Patrick F. Fischer, R. Patrick DeWine, Joseph T. Deters, and Megan E. Shanahan joined Justice Hawkins’ opinion.
In a dissenting opinion, Justice Jennifer Brunner wrote the plain language of R.C. 2929.20 defined “eligible offender” to include those like Staffrey who were sentenced to indefinite prison terms before Ohio overhauled its criminal sentencing laws in 1996. Because R.C. 2929.20 does not specifically exclude those sentenced before the 1996 law change, the lower courts were correct in granting Staffrey judicial release, she wrote.
Inmate Turns to Revised Law To Be Freed
In 1996, Staffrey pleaded guilty to four first-degree felonies of rape, kidnapping, attempted aggravated murder, and aggravated burglary. The trial court imposed an indefinite sentence of 15-50 years in prison.
Staffrey’s sentence was imposed as the state was in the midst of overhauling its criminal sentences. Senate Bill 2 took effect in July 1996. He appealed his sentence, noting he was sentenced after July 1996. He argued based on changes made by SB 2, he should have received a definite sentence of a specific number of years rather than the range of 15 to 50 years. The Seventh District rejected his appeal in 1999, finding SB 2 sentencing applied only to crimes committed after July 1996, and not to crimes that occurred before SB 2 took effect.
A decade later in 2009, Staffrey attempted to withdraw his guilty plea. He argued he believed he was pleading to a sentence in 1996 that would enable him to be eligible for judicial release. He said he would not have pleaded had he known he would receive an indefinite sentence that was not eligible for judicial release. The Seventh District rejected his claim.
In 2011, the General Assembly passed House Bill 86, which expanded the definition of “eligible offender” who could qualify for judicial release.
In 2021, Staffrey filed for judicial release with the trial court. He did not cite any specific portion of R.C. 2929.20 to support his argument that he was an eligible offender. He asserted he was serving a “stated prison term of 15 to 50 years” and was eligible for release having served 27 years, more than half his sentence.
The Mahoning County prosecutor opposed the release, arguing an inmate with a pre-SB 2 sentence, such as Staffrey, is not serving a “stated prison term,” as defined in R.C. 2929.20. The prosecutor argued offenders like Staffrey can be released early by the Ohio Parole Board, but not through judicial release.
The prosecutor noted Staffrey had applied for parole and was rejected in 2021. However, the parole board told him it would again consider him for parole in 2023. Staffrey was denied parole seven times from 2010 to 2021.
The trial court conducted a hearing in 2023, where the prosecutor reiterated its position that Staffrey is not eligible. The trial judge did not make a determination of whether Staffrey was eligible under R.C. 2929.20, but made other findings, including that he completed the mandatory 15-year portion of this sentence. The court granted judicial release and placed Staffrey on five years of community control.
The prosecutor’s office appealed to the Seventh District. The Seventh District concluded that Staffrey met the definition of an eligible offender under the expanded definition in the 2011 law. The court affirmed Staffrey’s release. The prosecutor’s office appealed the decision to the Supreme Court.
Supreme Court Analyzed Revisions in Sentencing Law
Justice Hawkins explained the parties refer to three significant sentencing reforms that were enacted in the past 30 years. S.B.2 was enacted in July 1996 and established “truth in sentencing.” The intent was to replace indefinite sentences that had ranges with a specific number of years imposed by a judge. The law introduced judicial release and required an offender to serve the entire prison term unless released by a judge.
Justice Hawkins noted the Supreme Court ruled in its 1998 State v. Rush decision that judicial release under S.B. 2 only applied to those who committed crimes after the law took effect in 1996.
In 2011, H.B. 86 was a second major reform, in which the General Assembly endeavored “to reduce the state’s prison population and to save the associated costs of incarceration by diverting certain offenders from prison and shortening the terms of other offenders sentenced to prison.” H.B. 86 changed R.C. 2929.20 to state that “any person who, on or after April 7, 2009, is serving a stated prison term that includes one or more nonmandatory prison terms,” and already completed any mandatory terms, is eligible for judicial release.
Justice Hawkins explained one more change that impacted this case. In 2019, lawmakers enacted S. B. 201, known as the “Reagan Tokes Law.” This law revived the use of indefinite sentences in specific instances and allowed judges to again sentence an offender to a range of years in those cases.
Staffrey maintained he was eligible for judicial release under the H.B. 86 amendments and had completed his mandatory term of 15 years. He argued that by 2009, he was serving his nonmandatory time, which made him eligible for release after he served half his sentence.
The Court stated, “Staffrey’s analysis of the statute’s text is incomplete.” To be eligible, Staffrey had to be serving a “stated prison term,” which is further defined in the sentencing law. Filing in 2021, Staffrey sought to use a provision in law that defines a “stated prison term” as a sentence that includes a “non-life felony indefinite prison term,” to which he was sentenced.
The Court stated the statutory definitions limited qualifying “non-life felony indefinite prison terms” to only those offenders serving indefinite sentences under the Reagan Tokes Law. The definition does not include sentences issued more than 30 years ago, prior to S.B. 2, the opinion stated.
“Under the applicable statutory definitions, the indefinite sentence that Staffrey is serving is not a 'stated prison term.’ As a result, he is not an ‘eligible offender,” the Court concluded.
Offender Eligible After 2011 Law Change, Dissent Maintained
In her dissent, Justice Brunner disagreed with the conclusion that offenders serving indefinite sentences issued prior to the 1996 law change are not eligible for judicial release.
“The language of R.C 2929.20 requires no speculation about what the General Assembly intended,” she wrote. The 2011 amendments apply to any person serving a stated prison term that includes a nonmandatory prison term. Staffrey met the definition of an eligible offender after he served his mandatory 15-year term.
The law does not specify that “stated prison term” applies only to those with indefinite sentences issued after the Tokes Law took effect in 2019, Justice Brunner stated. The 2011 revisions to R.C. 2929.20 gave trial courts the right to assess whether any offender serving an indefinite prison term is eligible for release, she wrote.
In light of her analysis of Staffrey’s eligibility as an offender for consideration under R.C. 2929.20, Justice Brunner wrote, “Trial courts are in the best position to adjudge the facts relating to an offender’s eligibility for judicial release and to utilize the full breadth of options available to them under duly enacted statutes, including R.C. 2929.20.”
The case is cited 2024-0108. State v. Staffrey, Slip Opinion No. 2025-Ohio-2889.