Login | December 07, 2024

Court rules traffic stop leading to gun discovery Is constitutional

DAN TREVAS
Supreme Court
Public Information Office

Published: November 1, 2024

When an officer stops a vehicle with reasonable suspicion the owner does not have a valid license but later discovers someone other than the owner is driving, the officer can ask the unknown driver to produce a driver’s license, the Supreme Court of Ohio ruled recently.
A divided Supreme Court found a Geauga County police officer, who discovered an unloaded firearm in a vehicle, did not violate the constitutional rights of the driver of a vehicle when asking if he had a valid driver’s license.
The Court explained the officer pulled over the car because the owner’s license was suspended. The Court addressed the question of whether the officer violated the driver’s rights by asking if he had a valid license after the officer realized the driver was not the car’s owner.
“Under controlling United States Supreme Court precedent, an officer who has properly executed a traffic stop may make ordinary inquiries necessary to complete the mission of the traffic stop – including confirming that the driver has a valid driver’s license,” Justice R. Patrick DeWine wrote.
The Court reversed an Eleventh District Court of Appeals decision, which found the officer had no valid reason to question the driver once he noticed the owner with the suspended license was not driving. The reversal reinstated the convictions of Jessica Dunlap and Je’Brel Lewis for improperly handling a firearm in the motor vehicle they were driving.
Five Justices agreed the Eleventh District was incorrect, issuing three separate opinions. Justices Patrick F. Fischer and Joseph T. Deters joined Justice DeWine’s opinion, which found the precedent set by a 2015 U.S. Supreme Court decision resolved the case.
Justice Michael P. Donnelly concurred in judgment only, arguing the case could be resolved on narrower grounds by applying a 1997 Supreme Court of Ohio decision. Because the officer could validly ask a general question, and because the driver gave the officer a suspicious answer, part of which the officer already knew was untrue, the officer had the right to verify the driver’s license, Justice Donnelly maintained.
In a separate opinion concurring in judgment only, Justice Melody Stewart disagreed that the U.S. Supreme Court decision resolved the case. Rather, she noted that state law requires drivers to provide proof of a driver’s license when asked by a police officer. She also wrote that a 2001 Supreme Court of Ohio decision finding driver’s license checkpoints to be constitutional could apply to this case, and the minimal intrusion of asking to see Lewis’ driver’s license did not violate his rights.
In a dissenting opinion, Chief Justice Sharon L. Kennedy cited U.S. Supreme Court and Supreme Court of Ohio decisions, which found once the officer confirmed the owner of the car was not driving, he had no further reason to stop and question the vehicle occupants. She wrote the stop and subsequent search of the vehicle was unconstitutional.
Justice Jennifer Brunner joined Chief Justice Kennedy’s dissent.
Officer Stopped Car After Randomly Checking Registrations
In 2021, Chester Township Police Officer Andrew Centrackio was checking registrations of passing cars using the Law Enforcement Automated Data System (LEADS). He checked a car with a temporary tag belonging to Dunlap. The LEADS system provided some of Dunlap’s identifying information, including her height, weight, gender, and age. The system revealed Dunlap had a suspended driver’s license.
Centrackio pulled the car over, but he could not see the driver until he walked up to the driver’s side window. He then realized the car was not being driven by the owner, Dunlap, a white female, but by Lewis, a Black male. Dunlap was in the passenger seat.
Centrackio told Lewis he pulled the car over because the registered owner had a suspended license. Lewis responded, “She got court for that.” The officer asked Lewis if his driver’s license was valid. Lewis replied, “I believe I’m valid. If not, she’s valid.”
The officer asked for Lewis’ driver’s license, and he handed him a state identification card. Centrackio walked back to his patrol car to verify Lewis’ driving status and shouted to them, “If you’re valid, you guys are good to go.”
Searching the LEADS system, Centrackio found Lewis had a suspended license, and also active arrest warrants. Additionally, Lewis had a prior charge of improper handling of a firearm in a motor vehicle. Centrackio returned to the car and asked if there were any weapons. Lewis told him an unloaded gun was in the front passenger-side door. The officer found the unloaded gun and a loaded magazine on the floor of the back seat. Dunlap and Lewis were charged with improper handling of a firearm in a motor vehicle.
Pair Seek To Suppress Evidence
Dunlap and Lewis asked the trial court to suppress the evidence of the gun, arguing it was discovered after the officer unlawfully prolonged the stop by asking Lewis about his driver’s license. The trial court denied the motion, and the two pleaded no contest to the charges. They both appealed to the Eleventh District.
The Eleventh District held that once Centrackio realized Dunlap was not the driver, he no longer had reasonable suspicion for the stop to continue, and it was impermissible to ask Lewis for identification.
The Geauga County Prosecutor’s Office appealed the decision to the Supreme Court. The Eleventh District also acknowledged its decision was in conflict with a 1993 Ninth District decision. The Court agreed to resolve the conflict and hear the case.
Supreme Court Analyzed Legality of Traffic Stop
No party in the case disputed the stop of Dunlap’s car by Centrackio was legal. Justice DeWine explained the only issue was whether, under the Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, Centrackio had the right to ask Lewis if he had a valid driver’s license after he had executed a valid traffic stop.
The opinion noted the U.S. Supreme Court’s 2015 Rodriguez v. United States decision, in which the high court explained a police officer can extend a valid traffic stop long enough to complete the mission of the stop—which includes ordinary inquiries typical of a traffic stop. Ordinary inquiries include checking the driver’s license, determining whether there are outstanding warrants against the driver, and inspecting the vehicle’s registration and proof of insurance, the United States Supreme Court explained in Rodriguez.
The inquiries about a driver’s license are within the mission of a valid traffic stop because it serves the same objective as the initial reason for the stop, the Court reasoned, which is to enforce the traffic code and ensure vehicles on the road are operated safely. Centrackio stopped the car because he had a reasonable suspicion the driver did not have a valid license. Asking Lewis if his license was valid “was consistent with the stop’s mission of ensuring that the vehicle was being operated by a properly licensed driver,” the opinion stated.
The lead opinion explained that its ruling does not mean any officer could require a driver to produce a license at random. Rather, the decision is limited to instances when the officer already has the right to make a traffic stop, as Centrackio did when the LEADS system indicated the owner had a suspended license, the Court noted.
“Here, Officer Centrackio’s mission was not complete until he ascertained whether the driver of the vehicle had a valid license. Whether Dunlap or any other driver was operating the vehicle, completing the mission of the stop included the ‘ordinary inquir[y] incident’ to the stop of checking the driver’s license,” the Court concluded.
Driver’s License Verification Justified, Concurrence Maintained
In his concurring opinion, Justice Donnelly wrote the specific facts of this case do not warrant applying the Rodriguez ruling, but rather can be resolved by Ohio’s 1997 State v. Robinette decision. In Robinette, the Court found a traffic stop can be extended if the questioning is minimally intrusive and the questioning serves a public interest.
Justice Donnelly wrote Centrackio’s suspicion of a crime was dispelled once he reached the car and saw Dunlap was not driving. However, he prolonged the stop for 10 seconds by asking Lewis, “How’s it going?” and “Are you valid?”
Lewis’ suspicious and “illogical answer” response, “I believe I’m valid. If not, she’s valid” implied Dunlap had a valid driver’s license when the officer knew it was not true, the concurrence explained. The Fourth Amendment does not permit a suspicionless traffic top to verify the validity of a driver’s license, but when a vehicle is properly stopped, an officer can briefly question the vehicle occupants – “even after the purpose of the stop has ended – under certain circumstances,” Justice Donnelly wrote. In this case, the officer was justified in asking Lewis for his license because Lewis’ answer gave Centrackio reasonable suspicion that Lewis was driving without a valid license, the concurrence concluded.
Asking for License Permissible, Concurrence Concluded
In her concurrence in judgment only, Justice Stewart also found the Rodriguez decision did not apply, but noted that driving on public roads is a privilege for which the state requires licensure, citing R.C. 4507.35(A), which requires a driver to furnish satisfactory proof of a valid driver’s license upon a peace officer’s demand. Additionally, in its 2001 State v. Orr decision, the Court found a driver’s license checkpoint was valid when brief, minimally-intrusive stops were made to ensure the state’s interest that only those qualified to drive were operating vehicles on public roads.
Centrackio told Lewis if he had a valid license, “you guys are good to go,” she noted, indicating the scope of the license check was to determine whether Lewis was a licensed driver. Because the officer had reasonable suspicion to initiate the stop, the minimal intrusion of checking whether the driver had a valid license did not violate Lewis’ constitutional rights, Justice Stewart concluded.
Stop Must End When Suspicion of Crime Ceased, Dissent Asserted
Chief Justice Kennedy explained that, in her view, the facts of this case fell “between the bookends” of the U.S. Supreme Court’s decisions Kansas v. Glover, which addressed when an officer has reasonable suspicion to initiate a traffic stop, and Rodriguez, which discussed when an officer has authority to extend a traffic stop and make inquiries. For this reason, neither case controlled the outcome. However, the chief justice noted that the U.S. Supreme Court had recognized that the reasonable suspicion supporting a traffic stop for driving with a suspended license could be dispelled when the officer learns facts that exculpate the driver. And she also pointed to Ohio Supreme Court precedent holding that a police officer who stopped a vehicle with the reasonable suspicion that the vehicle was not properly registered lost the authority to continue the stop when the officer saw that the proper registration was present in the rear window.
The chief justice explained that the issue before the Court was whether Centrackio was justified in continuing to detain the car’s occupants once he learned information that dispelled his suspicion of criminal activity. She wrote that characterizing the “mission” of the stop as ensuring that a licensed driver was behind the wheel expanded the definition of “mission” too broadly.
“There is no constitutionally valid explanation for the mission being to ensure that any driver of the vehicle was licensed when the officer’s suspicion – the constitutional foundation of the stop – was that a specific individual was driving without a license,” the dissent stated.
The chief justice acknowledged that Centrackio had reasonable suspicion to stop the vehicle based on the LEADS search and his inability to see the driver’s physical characteristics before he reached the driver’s window. His suspicion that Dunlap was driving with a suspended license was dispelled, however, once he saw that Dunlap was not driving. Centrackio testified that he only stopped the car because the registered owner had a suspended license, and his mission ended when he learned that the registered owner was not driving the car, the dissent stated.
“To allow a police officer to continue to detain a driver when reasonable suspicion of criminal activity no longer exists is tantamount to allowing a police officer to approach any car and request that its driver produce a license to ensure that a licensed driver is behind the wheel,” Chief Justice Kennedy wrote.
The case is cited 2022-1227, 2022-1237, 2022-1229, and 2022-1238 State v. Dunlap, Slip Opinion No. 2024-Ohio-4821.


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