Youngstown Daily Legal News

Court rules teacher who damaged husband's ex-wife's car with hammer shouldn't have been suspended

JESSICA SHAMBAUGH
Special to the Legal News
Published: April 27, 2015

The Ohio State Board of Education cannot suspend a teacher’s license based on disorderly conduct without showing that the conduct hindered her ability to teach, according to a recent ruling from the 3rd District Court of Appeals.

The three-judge appellate panel affirmed a Shelby County Court of Common Pleas ruling finding that the board improperly suspended Kimberly Wall’s teaching license based on a disorderly conduct conviction.

The judges held that the board had to demonstrate a nexus between Wall’s conduct and her performance as a teacher in order to suspend her.

“We cannot discern a nexus from the record because Wall’s offense did not involve children, did not occur during school hours and did not occur on school grounds,” Judge Vernon Preston wrote for the court.

The case stemmed from two complaints filed against Wall in the Sidney Municipal Court in November 2011.

At that time, Wall was an adjunct instructor at Sinclair Community College, where she taught reading a first-year student success.

The complaints alleged that Wall pulled her vehicle in front of a vehicle belonging to her husband’s ex-wife, Carolyn, causing Carolyn to slam on her brakes and stop in the road with no safe means of escape.

Wall then allegedly used a hammer to break Carolyn’s driver-side window and hit her front and rear driver-side doors.

Wall ultimately pleaded guilty to a reduced charge of disorderly conduct and the municipal court fined her $75 and sentenced her to 10 days in jail with five days suspended on the condition that she complete counseling and observe the terms of probation for one year.

In March 2013, the Ohio Department of Education notified Wall that it intended “to determine whether to limit, suspend, revoke or permanently revoke her five-year professional elementary teaching license issued in 2010.”

The department asserted that it needed to determine if her disorderly conduct conviction constituted “conduct unbecoming to the teaching profession.”

At an administrative hearing before a hearing officer in September 2013, the department presented testimony from Carolyn and a sheriff’s deputy to explain the nature of Wall’s offense.

In her defense, Wall called Anne Scaperoth, who testified that she had been counseling Wall for about a year.

Scaperoth opined that Wall presented only a “low-risk” to children in a school setting and explained that Wall’s triggers were not related to her work.

Wall also called a personal acquaintance who testified that she had no concerns leaving Wall with her children. Finally, Wall testified on her own behalf.

The hearing officer concluded that Wall’s actions were unbecoming to a teacher but found “there is no nexus between Ms. Wall’s conviction and her future employment as a teacher.”

Based on that finding, the officer recommended that the board issue her a letter of admonishment.

However, in January 2014 the board decided not to issue the letter but instead suspended Wall’s license until June 2015.

Wall appealed that resolution to the Shelby County Court of Common Pleas and it reversed the board’s decision.

Specifically, the court ruled that the board’s actions were not based on substantial evidence that there was a nexus between Wall’s conduct and her ability to perform as a teacher.

The trial court ordered that the board issue Wall a letter as recommended by the hearing officer. It also denied Wall’s motion for attorney fees.

Both Wall and the board appealed those rulings.

The board argued that the trial court abused its discretion because there was no requirement for it to find a nexus between Wall’s conduct and her teaching ability.

The appellate judges, however, held that they were bound by its decision in Freisthler v. State Bd. of Edn., in which it ruled that “implicit in the wording ‘conduct that is unbecoming to the person’s profession, i.e. teaching’ is a requirement that the conduct in some way affect the individual’s ability to teach.”

“The trial court did not err in reversing the board’s suspension of Wall’s license because it was not supported by reliable, probative, and substantial evidence and is not in accordance with law — namely, the board did not present any reliable, probative or substantial evidence demonstrating a nexus between Wall’s conduct and her performance as a teacher,” Preston stated.

The judges ruled that none of the department’s evidence implicated that Wall was unfit to teach and, in fact, Wall presented evidence to the contrary.

“As such, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by reversing the board’s suspension of Wall’s license, as it is permitted to do so under R.C. 119.12, and reinstating the department’s hearing officer’s recommendation that Wall be issued a letter of admonishment,” Preston wrote.

On cross-appeal, Wall argued that she should have been granted attorney fees because there was no substantial justification for the board to disregard the department’s hearing officer’s recommendation.

The judges ruled that attorney fees should only be granted if the party was not justified in initiating the matter in question.

In this case, they found that the board was justified in initiating administrative action against Wall.

The judges held that Wall’s argument was erroneous because her attorney fees hinged on the justification of the original investigation, not any subsequent actions.

Therefore, they ruled that the trial court properly denied her motion and affirmed its judgment in full.

Presiding Judge Richard Rogers and Judge Vernon Shaw concurred.

The case is cited Wall v. State Bd. of Edn., 2015-Ohio-1418.

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